

# Do You Know My Name? How local elites influence primary election outcomes.\*

Mackenzie Lockhart<sup>†</sup>  
Job Market Paper

August 30, 2022

**Abstract:** Extensive evidence suggests that voters have little information about candidates in primary elections, yet Congressional primary electorates systematically tend to nominate ideologically extreme candidates and candidates with previous political experience. In this paper, I propose party activists influence the outcome of primary elections by providing resources used to generate name recognition for favored candidates. Primary election outcomes, then, reflect the interests of party actors moreso than the primary electorate. Using data on candidates, donors, campaigns, and voters, I show empirically that party activist support strongly predicts primary election outcomes regardless of candidate experience or ideology, but that this support uniquely aids candidates with names that are common and easy to remember. Together, this evidence suggests that the invisible primary is central to the dynamics of congressional primary elections in the United States and political elites use the heuristic of name recognition to influence voters.

**Keywords:** Primary elections; voter behaviour; political coordination; political polarization; political parties; invisible primary.

---

\*I thank Seth Hill, James Fowler, Pamela Ban, Jennifer Gaudette, participants at the 2022 Midwestern Political Science Association's and Canadian Political Science Association's conferences, and the UCSD American Politics workshop for feedback.

<sup>†</sup>PhD Candidate, University of California San Diego, Department of Political Science; [mwlockha@ucsd.edu](mailto:mwlockha@ucsd.edu), <https://www.maclockhart.com>.

# 1 Introduction

Why do primary elections work? Primary elections systematically nominate candidates who are both ideologically extreme relative to the median voter and have more legislative experience than would be expected at random. This holds even in competitive, multi-candidate primaries. Past research has noted this selection effect of primaries, comparing it to the preferences of voters for experienced candidates and noting the divergence of the median primary voter from the median voter in the general electorate to suggest primary nominations reflect the preferences of the primary electorate.

However, primaries pose a problem for voters on two fronts. First, the institutional features of primaries make them particularly challenging. There are often many feasible candidates in the race instead of two, there are fewer heuristics available to voters because party is held constant, the media environment is usually lower in information, and the consequences of a vote are less clear given the result is a nominee and not a representative. A primary might, for example, require voters to choose between 5 candidates, multiple of whom have prior elected experience and all of whom agree on most salient issues. Within parties, the degree of similarity between candidates will generally dwarf the degree of difference between them. Further, from a behavioural perspective, primary elections generally require voters to choose between candidates who are broadly similar on most dimensions which reduces the incentives for voters to actively search for information about the candidates and become involved. Research shows that voters are generally unable to distinguish between primary candidates on ideological dimensions, even when there might be a strategic incentive to do so (Ahler, Citrin, and Lenz, 2015; Ahler, Citrin, and Lenz, 2016; Hall and Lim, 2018). Voters lack the information necessary to make these subtle differentiations and likely further lack the motivation to do so. Even scholars of primary elections struggle to accurately measure intraparty differences in ideology (Bonica, 2018; Hirano et al., 2015). Yet despite these features, the outcomes of primaries follow clear patterns.

To explain this puzzle, I propose a model of campaigning where party backed candidates focus on connecting their name with their partisan label. In elections without many distinguishing

features between candidates, strategic candidates will promote their own name instead of focusing on contrast with the competition. Voters, in turn, can rely on this cue either through the positive impression generated by exposure or by using name recognition as a proxy for candidate valence traits; a candidate who runs a prominent campaign could be expected to be more competent than one who runs a worse campaign. Additionally to explain this puzzle, while previous research has focused on voter preferences, I turn to a measure of the preferences of local party actors following Hassell (2016) and investigate local party preferences over candidates to see how they explain primary outcomes. Research has shown that local party actors often have divergent preferences and beliefs from voters (Broockman et al., 2021; Lockhart and Hill, 2022; Kujala, 2021).

Empirically, I show that local parties strongly prefer candidates who have prior legislative experience and who are close to the median of the party's Congressional delegation. I then show that these preferences are reflected in the outcome of primary elections. Local party support, beyond other candidate attributes, predicts outcomes in primary elections. Finally to show the role of name recognition, I leverage variation in how easy a name is to remember. I argue more common names are easier to recall and so more readily generate name recognition through campaigning. Candidates with easier to remember names receive particularly large returns to campaigning compared to candidates with names that are more difficult to remember.

My research contributes to three important areas of understanding in politics and specifically primary elections. First, it builds on prior work showing the importance of political parties. Previous research focusing on the invisible primary has largely assumed party actors either push candidates out of the primary or provide direct endorsements (e.g. Kousser et al., 2015; Hassell, 2018; Kujala, 2021). Relatively little is known about how party actors impact vote choice in elections with less salience; when leaders are not providing direct endorsements and signals, how do they effect control over the party? I argue they do so through scarce resources that candidates use to build effective campaigns.

Second, this research directly tests the role of name recognition in elections, an element that has long been suggested as important in low information environments, but has rarely been directly

tested using election data (Kam and Zechmeister, 2013; Jacobson and Carson, 2019). This contributes to our understanding of how voters might use heuristics to find suitable candidates, even in extremely low information environments such as open primary elections. Further, I provide a theory as to why this might be rational for voters to do.

Finally, it helps to explain why primary elections continue to produce polarizing results despite the general preference of voters for moderate candidates. One of the most important questions facing American politics is why polarization is occurring despite incentives to moderate (Hirano et al., 2010; Theriault, 2006; McCarty, 2019). By connecting voter behaviour to party involvement, I show that polarization can occur even when voters in primaries prefer moderates.

This paper proceeds in four parts. First, I show that the existing literature lacks a convincing explanation for empirical patterns observed in primary elections. Second, I develop a theory of party control of primaries that uses differences in candidate name recognition as a path for parties to shape primary election outcomes. Third, I show that parties are committed to selecting an ideologically homogenous and experienced group of candidates to support. Finally, I present empirical results showing that party power in primary elections is conditional on the ability of candidates to build name recognition. I conclude by discussing how these results help build a deeper understanding of the role of parties and voter in primary elections.

## **2 Existing Literature**

Existing research suggests that down-ballot primary elections are a hard case for voters in American elections. General elections provide both more distinct choices and more accessible heuristics for voters to make use of than their primary counterpart. Candidates in the two major parties differ in predictable ways across social, economic, and foreign policy issues (Moskowitz, 2021). A voter can reasonably differentiate the general election candidates based solely on their party affiliation and the candidates' likely issue positions to compare with their own positions.

Further, when voting across many different elections voters in general elections can make use of party labels as a heuristic to simplify the question of who to vote for (Downs, 1957; Schaffner

and Streb, 2002). The same basic heuristic of party label can inform voters' decisions in national, state, and local elections and so serves to structure much of politics. This is evidenced by the fact that most voters in general elections do not split their ticket across levels of government or office, suggesting their votes are largely driven by differences between the parties rather than candidate specific features. General elections thus serve as an easy case for voters wishing to make policy driven choices.

In primaries, policy differences are muted and the partisan cue is absent. Voters face a much more difficult choice as a result. In one example, Hirano et al. (2015) tried to place candidates running for state legislative offices on an ideological spectrum relative to one another to identify more extreme or moderate candidates using statements and media coverage of the candidates. Despite their expertise, even they found it challenging in many cases to even produce an estimate of candidate ideologies. In practice, this seems to match with voters' own experiences. Ahler, Citrin, and Lenz (2016) investigate the impact of reforms to California's voting system designed to increase the incentive for candidates to moderate by moving to a top-two primary system as opposed to partisan primaries. The change was supposed to advantage candidates who could appeal to moderate voters from each party, but Ahler and coauthors found no such moderating effect. They argue that this lack of centripetal force was because voters could not successfully identify the more moderate candidates to support. The information necessary to distinguish the ideology of candidates from the same party was too difficult to find and voters had to rely on other cues. In my own work speaking to voters, I have also found support for the limited role of ideology in the minds of voters. Conducting exit polls of Texas primary elections in 2020, I found that voters were rarely able to place even their preferred candidate on an ideological spectrum. In almost no cases did voters provide multiple ideological placements, suggestion they knew little about the ideological positions of candidates<sup>1</sup>.

And yet primary elections seem to explain two important phenomena observed empirically in Congressional elections that would suggest voters are operating more systematically than the

---

<sup>1</sup>Because the results turned out to include so much missingness, I was not able to compile any meaningful analysis although additional quotes are presented later.

evidence suggests. First, research by Hirano and Snyder (2019) suggests that primaries act as an effective screening mechanism for parties by ensuring high quality candidates make it to the general election. They argue that, empirically, primaries serve surprisingly well at screening out potential candidates who lack experience and other non-policy characteristics that would hurt the party's chances in the general election. Looking at historical data, they find past elected experience has consistently conferred a substantial advantage to politicians seeking their party's nomination in a primary election.

Second, primary elections apparently reinforce ideological homogeneity within parties. Primaries consistently advantage more extreme candidates at the expense of moderate candidates. While early reformers thought primaries would produce results largely reflective of local characteristics, the introduction of primaries has largely reinforced party homogeneity. Members of Congress consistently demonstrate behaviour that suggests they are concerned about challenges in their primary if they do not act sufficiently in line with the party agenda while in Congress (Boatright, 2013). Further, despite the theoretical possibility of 'crossover voting" discussed by some scholars (Cho and Kang, 2015), there exists no evidence for this kind of behaviour. Primaries consistently nominate candidates in line with the party's agenda.

In fact, the tendency for primaries to nominate non-centrist candidates has been exaggerated over time and likely contributes to polarization in Congress. Since the 1960s, primaries have nominated increasingly extreme candidates (Hill and Tausanovitch, 2018). While the exact cause of the shift in candidate nominations is contentious, it is clear that replacement through primary elections is the driving force in polarization, not changes in existing representative's behaviour (Therriault, 2006).

More unclear than the outcome of primaries or voter competence is what parties do in primary elections. There is limited evidence to suggest a role for parties in primaries, but the overall extent of this evidence is still small and only speaks to some facets of party involvement. Most notable is the research by Hans Hassel that shows party involvement in Senatorial primaries is an important source of primary success (Hassell, 2016). Hill (2020) also finds evidence that when institutional

reforms aimed to limited the formal role of parties are introduced, campaign contributions also increase. He argues that this represents parties finding alternative pathways for influence over primary elections. It is this line of research that I build on below.

### **3 Name Recognition as Party Power**

To reconcile the activity of parties in primaries and their predictable outcome, I turn to the role of name recognition in determining vote choice. Name recognition is often used loosely in the literature, but I use it to refer narrowly to the *familiarity of a candidate's name, regardless of any associated feelings*. Voters might know nothing about a candidate but recognize their name strongly in some cases while in others they might have strong positive or negative feelings associated with the candidate whose name they recognize.

The role of name recognition as a shortcut in elections has a long history. Jacobson (2015), for example, argues that name recognition is one of the important drivers of incumbent success in Congressional politics. Burden (2002) looks at bad press coverage in primary elections and argues that it produced positive benefits for candidates by increasing their name recognition. Many more scholars argue that name recognition, on its own, contribute to the success of candidates

How does this mechanism work? Voters can use their recognition of a candidate's name, regardless of whether they have developed associated feelings, as a heuristic in extremely low information environments. Absent any additional information about candidates' experiences and platforms, a familiar name can be enough for a voter to select one candidate over another. Previous work by Kam and Zechmeister (2013) provides evidence for this; they show that exposure to candidate names, when presented without additional information, can be enough to win the support of voters in a lab setting. They argue that name recognition on its own is enough to generate positive impressions through the mere exposure effect (Bornstein and D'Agostino, 1992b). Stimuli that are more familiar are more easily processed, which in turn might suggest they are safer or benign choices.

This model is roughly consistent with an online processing model in which voters rely on

impressions of candidates rather than specific facts about the candidates they can recall (Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh, 1989). This model does not require voters to make an explicit comparison between their options; instead they can focus on their general impression of candidates. Like with name recognitions, voters do not need to compare candidates on policy or personal dimensions to choose a candidate; they can select their preferred candidate without any knowledge of who they are.

Voters themselves support this idea when asked about their primary votes. When asked why they support a given candidate, most voters offer only general reasons such as the candidate's "value" or they "agreed on most stances", without naming specific issues or positions<sup>2</sup>. In my own exit interviews, no voter offered information comparing their preferred candidate to any other in the field; their focus was on the candidate they voted for. Voters do not know specific details or provide comparisons between candidates.

Name recognition offers an explanation for how voters might decide in primary elections given their lack of knowledge of the candidates. In fact, when asked many voters explicitly say that their choice was based on name recognition or having heard of the candidate<sup>3</sup>. As discussed above, voters in primaries generally struggle to differentiate the candidates they are presented with. In many important ways, the candidates are similar to one another and more subtle differences are hard to come across and remember. In this case, absent other information, Kam and Zechmeister (2013) show that voters tend to revert to this simplest of heuristic. While they might prefer to make their decision along more sophisticated dimensions, voters can fall back on candidate recognition to make a choice among candidates who they know little or nothing about.

Given the incentive to build name recognition in the electorate, successful primary campaigns should orient themselves around this goal. Increasing the profile or familiarity of a candidate in a low information race can increase their support, regardless of whether voters can recall anything

---

<sup>2</sup>These quotes are based on exit interviews I conducted with voters in competitive primary elections in Texas in 2020. Other voters specified name recognition, having heard of the candidate, or a general good feeling as the reason for their vote. Few voters named a specific policy position the candidate held and fewer still suggested they knew anything about candidates besides their preferred choice.

<sup>3</sup>In the same exit poll, as many voters mentioned ideology as did name recognition.



about the candidate or even form an impression of the candidate. Candidates can engage in a wide array of activities to do this, from placing lawn signs in prominent locations, door knocking, attending or hosting local events, and of course through direct advertising campaigns. In fact, much of the activity campaigns engage in can be thought of as generating name recognition.

Crucially, name recognition can be built by any candidate. It does not depend on a candidate being ideologically close to the primary electorate, nor does it directly depend on the skills of the candidate or whether the candidate would be seen as qualified by the electorate. Any candidate who runs an active campaign has the ability to generate name recognition, particularly if they focus on building it. This provides a pathway for local parties to influence primaries directly. In essence, the low information environment in primary elections allows parties additional control as they can influence primaries through a channel that does not depend on an informed citizenry. While in higher information environments like presidential primaries, power might be exerted through endorsements or signals of ideology, in low information environments a much weaker signal is all that is necessary to build support. This gives parties more room to shape the outcome of elections as any desired candidate can benefit from the party support.

What should this look like? Based on existing research showing patterns in primary elections, we should expect parties to be targeting two types of candidates. First, while voters might prefer more moderate candidates (Hall and Lim, 2018), we should expect parties to nominate relatively more extreme candidates (Broockman et al., 2021). However, there is a limit to this extremity; local party actors will not support the most extreme candidates who are even more extreme than they are. Instead, their support will be narrowly focused on candidates that match the extremity of the party as it currently exists in Congress. On average, candidates closer to the median Member of Congress of the party should benefit from party support.

Second, we should expect parties to support more experienced candidates. This follows Hirano and Snyder (2019)'s findings that experienced candidates receive an electoral benefit in primary elections. I argue experienced candidates are more likely to be known to local party actors and therefore more likely to receive their support. Local party actors, in turn, would prefer experienced

candidates as they already know the candidates disposition and ideology.

### **3.1 Voters and the invisible primary**

Why would it be rational for voters to use name recognition as a shortcut for voting in primary elections? Another way to understand the impact of name recognition is from the perspective of the voter. Voters can use name recognition as a heuristic for valence characteristics and a proxy for ideology, especially when parties are homogenous.

Unlike in general elections, the primary election pits candidates with similar ideological positions against one another. Republican primary candidates tend to hold similar preferences for reduced taxes and spending as well as for socially conservative policy while Democratic primary candidates hold the opposite positions in large. While high profile intraparty disagreements and factions do emerge, polarization has increased the homogeneity of the two political parties dramatically, increasing the amount of intraparty agreement (Dancey and Sheagley, 2018). Increasingly, both moderate and extreme members of Congress vote along party lines; since 1970 party line voting has gone from around 60% to around 90% in Congress.

As co-partisans become increasingly likely to vote with one another and hold similar policy positions, the benefit of primary elections as policy selection tools decreases. The expected gap in policy outcomes between electing a moderate and extreme representative of the same party has shrunk, reducing the potential utility voters derive from selecting a candidate marginally closer to their position. In a case such as that with reduced party heterogeneity, a rational voter might respond by relying on informational cues that are easier and less costly to locate while still providing some differentiating information.

These cues might include name recognition, candidate ethnicity and gender, or possibly candidate background if that is listed on the ballot.<sup>4</sup> Among these cues, name recognition has the largest potential to act as a reliable shortcut as it provides two potential pieces of information to voters. First, it provides valence information about candidates in the form of their fundraising and campaigning abilities as generating name recognition requires mounting a credible and reasonably

---

<sup>4</sup>In California, for example, candidates may designate an occupation on the ballot.

competent campaign. In this way, name recognition is an example of a recognition heuristic where a positive trait (campaign skills) might correlate with recognition and become a useful shortcut.

This path operates through how candidates generate name recognition. For voters to develop a sense of who a candidate is, they must be exposed to the candidate during the election campaign. The more frequent the exposure (across advertising, campaigning, and word of mouth), the stronger the voter's recognition of a candidate will be. Even if the voter has not followed an election campaign, they can infer that candidates they recognize must have mounted some campaign and the candidate who seems the most familiar likely lead one of the most active campaigns. If voters are interested in candidates who will be generate positive campaign activity lead up to the general election, they can use name recognition to infer which candidate is likely to be best at campaigning.

Second, to the extent that parties are an important source of support for candidates and their support leads to higher name recognition, name recognition can be used as a cue by voters to infer that candidates hold positions broadly in line with the party. Put another way, name recognition can help voters screen out candidates who fall very far outside the mainstream of the party. This is because candidates who hold policy positions outside the norm for the party will struggle to find support in the local invisible primary. Without support, their campaigns will struggle to generate the activity necessary for building name recognition in the electorate. A candidate a voter recognizes in the primary election is likely to be a reasonable representation of the party they support, even if the voter does not know the candidate's policy positions specifically.

## **4 Data and Methods**

### **4.1 Methods**

My analysis proceeds in two parts. First, I use data on open-seat primaries to show that party support explains some of the relationship between ideology, experience, and election outcomes. Then I show that this relationship can be explained using the mechanism of name recognition. Below I outline these two analyses.

I begin with a measure of party support in local elections, following Hassell (2016). I do this by focusing on donors who contribute to the central parties. I classify party contributors as those who gave to one or more of the Democratic National Committee, Republican National Committee, or any of the four party campaign committees for the House and Senate in that cycle. These donors are those who are most likely to be involved with the political party at the local level and likely to provide additional support in the form of volunteering or other resources Hassell (2016). Candidates who receive donations from these donors are likely those favored by the local party.

To measure the preferences of local party actors, I look at what factors predict support from party contributors. I look at two key factors that might influence the support from party actors. First, I look at the ideological distance between candidates and the median candidate for a party. I expect that, all else equal, parties are likely to support candidates who are neither too extreme nor too moderate; they're likely to back candidates who closely resemble the existing ideological landscape of the party. These candidates likely resemble the donors themselves as they fit closely to the national image of the party, as we might expect contributors to national campaigns to be. Following Jacobson (1989) and Hirano and Snyder (2019), I then look at the impact of experience on party support. I expect that candidates with prior experience in elected office will be significantly more likely to gain the support of party contributors.

To show the role of party support, I compare restricted to full models where I exclude and then include party support as an explanatory variable. If party support does explain the relationship between candidate traits and election outcomes, controlling for party support should attenuate this relationship and I should observe a weaker relationship in those models. This leads to my first hypothesis:

H1: When controlling for party support, the relationship between ideology, experience, and campaign outcomes will be reduced.

To test the role of name recognition in primaries, I take advantage of variation in how easy candidate names are to remember. Candidates with names that are easier to remember should generate more name recognition at a given level of campaigning; for each advertisement or campaign

contact a voter encounters, a candidate with an easy-to-remember name will generate more name recognition than a candidate whose name is hard to remember. Candidates with very difficult-to-remember names will need significantly more advertising to generate name recognition in the electorate.

What types of names are easier to remember? Literature from the fields of psychology, marketing and economics give some advice in this area. First, there is strong evidence to suggest that the most important precondition for memory is the processing of a stimuli. Research has consistently shown that people need to actively process a stimuli in order to recall it later (Bornstein and D'Agostino, 1992a); skimming an unfamiliar word, for example, is not enough to produce recognition. In the domain of names, this means that to learn and recall a name people must actively process that name.

Importantly, features of a name can make that processing more or less likely. Evidence from marketing studies suggests that brand names that are common words are easier for consumers to recall than novel words; when presented with brand names that are novel words, consumers insufficiently engage with them to recall them later (Lerman and Garbarino, 2002). Similarly, evidence from economics shows that names that are easier to pronounce and more familiar are potentially easier to recall, leading to better job market outcomes (Ge and Wu, 2022). The mechanism is likely that people need to process a word to generate recall. Seeing a name without reading it will generate minimal recall, so names that are unfamiliar and hard to read will be readily skipped over and forgotten. Names that people find easy to read because they are short or used to will be read and will therefore generate recognition. This is a similar mechanism to the 'reception' mechanism outlined in Zaller (1992) in which exposure alone is not enough to generate recall; voters need to cognitively engage with something to remember it.

Based on this, I use the familiarity of candidate surnames as a measure of how easy these surnames are to remember. Because surnames are shared across individuals, some candidates will have more familiar surnames to voters; if a surname is widely shared, it will be very familiar to voters as they will be used to seeing it often. Candidates with surnames that are more common,

then, should be more memorable to voters as a result as voters will be used to reading or hearing these names, making them easy to process. If voters find these names easier to process, then they will also find them more easily recall them, resulting in higher candidate name recognition for candidates with common names.

I then use this variation in surname commonality to see if name memorability mediates the relationship between party support and election outcomes. This builds on the work of Hassell (2016). I begin by replicating his finding that receiving support from local party actors is associated with success in primary elections. Crucially, though, I look at what happens when this measure is interacted with a measure of name commonality, using name commonality as a proxy for memorability. I expect that if party support is leading to candidates generating name recognition through their campaign activities, the independent effect of party support will depend on how easy a candidate's name is to remember. Candidates with more familiar names should find it easier to build name recognition and therefore support. Specifically, candidate with very hard to remember names will receive very small returns to campaigning. Campaign activities that are meant to build name recognition will not help these candidates. Candidates with easy to remember names, however, will receive electoral benefits only when they campaign to build name recognition; name commonality on its own should not have a direct effect on a candidate's electoral prospects. This gives me my second hypothesis:

H2: Candidates with more common surnames will experience larger returns to party support.

I also control for additional features to identify the impact of name recognition. First, I control for the ideology of the candidate. Past research has shown the important role of ideology in predicting primary outcomes (Boatright, 2013); if this is correlated with party support it might be that parties and voters both prefer the same type of candidate and so the relationship would be spurious. I also control for candidate experience. By controlling for ideology and experience, I limit the concern that voter preference and party support are being driven by the same valence characteristics; they would have to both be driven by additional features besides experience and ideology to explain the relationship.

I further control for district features that do not vary over time and shocks that impact specific years with district and year fixed effects. This controls for differences that might be attributed to either the district's location or composition or shocks such as wave elections that impact all districts. Thus the results use within district variation in name recognition and party support to predict election outcomes, reducing the chance that the results could be driven by specific features of the district.

## **4.2 Data**

To conduct this analysis, I bring together data on 5 different aspects of primary elections. My main outcome of interest is the electoral success of candidates. To measure this, I use election returns covering 21st century primary elections for the House of Representatives in every state. This data is collected from Hirano and Snyder (2019) and supplemented with additional electoral returns from the Federal Elections Commission. All candidates who appeared on the election ballot appear in this data set.

Next, I use campaign finance data from Bonica (2014) to measure two additional variables of interest: candidate ideology and party support. To measure the ideology of candidates in primary elections, many of whom never hold elected office, I use the CF Scores constructed by Bonica (2014). These scores assume that donors in elections donate to candidates with similar ideologies and policy positions to their own to recover systematic estimates of ideology for candidates who are never elected. Following Hassell (2018) and Lockhart and Hill (2022), I classify party contributors as those who gave to one or more of the Democratic National Committee, Republican National Committee, or any of the four party campaign committees for the House and Senate in a given cycle. Candidates who receive donations from party contributors should be those who are receiving support from local party actors who are involved in the primary; these donations should track other types of non-monetary support from these actors.

This operationalization of party support is a more broad one than that used by Hassell (2018) as it captures donations to any national political organization as opposed to just the national Senate campaigns. As a result, it captures a wider swatch of donors who might be involved in party politics

at the local level. I then assign each candidate the proportion of the overall party support in their district they receive; if a candidate receives the entire support of their party, their score is a 1 and if they receive no support from party donors, it is a 0. Zero is the modal party support score as most candidates are not backed by party contributors. This measure captures a range of donors, some of whom may not be particularly involved in party politics; however, Hassell (2018) has shown that this measure does capture party behaviour at the local level. Put another way, despite noise induced by some donors being only minimally involved in the party itself, the measure has been shown to reliably capture local party support for a candidate.

I measure candidate experience using data collected by Porter and Treul (2019) on candidate experience. This data draws on candidate biographical information to measure whether a candidate is considered experienced. Following Hirano and Snyder (2019), I define any candidate with prior legislative experience in state or municipal governments as being experienced.

Finally, to measure the impact of name commonality on electoral success I use the US Census Bureau's decennial publication of surname frequency per 100,000 individuals. This list provides data on surname frequency in the United States for all names that occur more than 100 times in the given census. Names that occur less than 100 times are given a score of 0. Because this is a skewed distribution, I take the log of surname frequency (I add 1 to the name commonality before taking the log to account for candidates with a 0 commonality score). In the appendix, I show the 25 most common names; they represent a broad mix of apparent racial and ethnic backgrounds suggesting name frequency is relatively uninformative as a signal on its own.

## **5 Party Involvement**

Figure 1 plots the distribution of candidate ideologies for both party supported and non-party supported candidates. The distribution shows that Democrats are significantly more likely to support candidates who are left of center and clustered around a score of -1. This represents a reasonably liberal but not extreme candidate within the party, similar to the median member of the Democratic Caucus in Congress. Neither extreme nor overly centrist candidates receive significant party






Figure 1: Distribution of primary candidate ideology by party support status among Democrats. Party supported candidates are dark blue, other candidates are light blue.




Figure 2: Distribution of primary candidate ideology by party support status among Republicans. Party supported candidates are dark red, other candidates are light red.

support.

Republicans behave similarly, though following previous work there is some evidence they prefer slightly more extreme candidates than Democrats. Figure 2 plots the same distribution and shows that Republican party support clusters around candidates who have DIME scores narrowly above 1. Again the party appears to select candidates relatively close to their median to support in primaries. Moderate and extreme candidates receive significantly less support.

Following this, I formalize these predictions in a model predicting support from parties. I further include the role that experience plays in generating support from local parties. To do so, I model whether a candidate receives party support as a function of the candidates previous experience in elected office, DIME score, and incumbency status. For this, I use the full sample of primary election candidates from 2012 to 2018, including candidates in open seats and challenger

Table 1: Impact of experience and distance from mean candidate ideology on support from party actors.

	Democrats	Republicans
Experienced	-0.017 [-0.294, 0.260]	0.016* [0.003, 0.029]
Distance from Mean Ideology	-0.194* [-0.352, -0.035]	-0.043*** [-0.063, -0.023]
Num.Obs.	2628	2937
R2	0.533	0.434
R2 Adj.	0.240	0.142

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

primaries. Table 1 shows that candidate experience is strongly predictive of support from both the Democrat and Republican parties. This suggests that parties are choosing to back candidates who have a high profile within the party; holding equal candidate ideology there is a preference for candidates who local actors will be more familiar with.

In this model, I code ideology as the absolute deviation from a party's average candidate in an election cycle. This captures that parties would rather support mainstream candidates who are neither moderate nor extreme. Parties should be likely to support candidates who are close to the mean of candidates running in a cycle. The results support this; party support declines significantly as candidates become either more moderate or more extreme. Democratic party donors in particular seem to respond to ideology of the candidates, focusing their donations on a narrow range of candidates.

Next, I look at Table 2 which examines the independent impact of party support on candidates' electoral fortunes. I now focus only on open seat primaries as the incumbency advantage is so large in primaries that it swamps the marginal effects of other variables. In this model, I control for both the ideology of the candidate and the experience of the candidate. It shows that while experience and ideology predict party support of primary candidates, party support itself is independently associated with winning primary elections. This suggests that some voters might respond to the candidates directly, but the invisible primary has an independent effect on other voters.

Table 2: Determinants of electoral success based on experience, ideology, and support from local party actors.

	Democrats	Democrats	Republicans	Republicans
Experienced	0.297*** [0.199, 0.395]	0.255*** [0.159, 0.352]	0.148** [0.049, 0.248]	0.137** [0.041, 0.233]
Ideology	-0.132** [-0.214, -0.050]	-0.096* [-0.176, -0.016]	-0.089*** [-0.141, -0.038]	-0.069** [-0.115, -0.023]
Support from Party		0.286** [0.090, 0.483]		0.586*** [0.384, 0.788]
Num.Obs.	448	448	628	628
R2	0.612	0.637	0.351	0.406
R2 Adj.	0.278	0.320	-0.015	0.068

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Support from party donors is significantly associated with winning primary elections, holding candidate ideologies constant. For Democrats, there is a 28% bonus to electability from party support while for Republicans this is higher at 60%, though this is comparing a candidate with perfect party coalescence to one who receives no support at all. This evidence suggests that party support must be providing a useful benefit to candidates; party donors are providing something that candidates can use to win primaries that goes beyond their ideology and past experience. We do also see that some of the effect of party support in the relationship between experience, ideology, and outcomes: when party support is controlled for, the relationship between these variables and electoral success is attenuated, especially for ideology. In the next section, I investigate this relationship by examining the possibility that party support impacts primary elections by helping build name recognition for candidates.

## 6 Name Recognition

I begin by examining the relationship between surname commonality, party support, and election outcomes in the data. I compare candidates with the 25% most common and uncommon surnames and the relationship between party support and primary outcomes in these groups. Figure 3 shows that this relationship, even in the raw data, is stronger for candidates with more common surnames.





Figure 3: Relationship between party support and primary election outcomes among candidates with the top 25% most common and 25% least common surnames. Blue line represents Lowess fit showing strong relationship among candidates with common surnames.

Table 3: Determinants of electoral success based on name commonality.

	Democrats	Democrats	Republicans	Republicans
Support from Party	0.018+ [-0.003, 0.039]	-0.005 [-0.028, 0.017]	0.604*** [0.397, 0.812]	-0.017 [-0.479, 0.444]
Ideology	0.040 [-0.016, 0.097]	0.035 [-0.019, 0.090]	0.020 [-0.008, 0.047]	0.030* [0.003, 0.057]
Experience	0.293*** [0.192, 0.393]	0.267*** [0.168, 0.366]	0.153** [0.058, 0.248]	0.154** [0.062, 0.246]
Log Name Frequency		-0.015 [-0.038, 0.009]		0.010 [-0.007, 0.027]
Total Donations		0.000** [0.000, 0.000]		0.000*** [0.000, 0.000]
Name Frequency X Party Support		0.008* [0.001, 0.014]		0.130** [0.033, 0.227]
Num.Obs.	480	480	628	628
R2	0.583	0.618	0.401	0.448
R2 Adj.	0.250	0.304	0.061	0.128

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

Candidates with common surnames who receive substantial party support are significantly more likely to win the primary compared to candidates with uncommon surnames who have the same level of party support. The data suggests that surname commonality, and therefore name recognition, might be playing a role in determining primary election outcomes.

Table 3 replicates the results of prior research in the context of primaries for the House of Representatives from 2010 to 2018. Columns 1 and 3 both show that candidates who receive donations from party contributors are significantly more likely to win primary elections, even when controlling for candidate ideology, district, and year. This replicates Hassell (2016)'s research on the Senate in the House. Additionally, surname frequency on its own has no impact on candidate success. Recall that the results include district and year fixed effects, as well as controls for candidate ideology, experience, and donations.

Columns 2 and 4 provide evidence that party support is acting through the generation of name recognition by increasing campaign activity. There are two important results here to note. First, when candidate names are added to the regression showing the advantage of party support, the

apparent impact of party support dissipates. This is not surprising but clearly shows the important role of name recognition.

Secondly, candidates with more common names do receive substantial returns to party support, especially on the Republican side. A candidate with a more common surname can expect to benefit much more from party support than a candidate with a less common name. A 1% increase in the commonness of a surname leads to a 0.008 increase in the impact of party support on candidate success for Democrats and a 0.13 increase in the impact of party support for Republicans. This provides evidence that voters need to be able to remember the name of the candidate for parties to be able to provide support. Candidates with unfamiliar names struggle to generate name recognition as efficiently.

To understand these results better, I focus on three cases. First, when a candidate has no party support, the association between name frequency and electoral success is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Common names do not, on their own, bestow an advantage for candidates suggesting voters are not using information from the name itself on the ballot. In the appendix, I show that this is likely because common surnames do convey information about other factors. First, I show that when imputed race based on surnames is included in these models, the effect remains. Second, I show that the most common surnames in the US include names that convey a wide range of races, ethnicity, and immigration status - the variables we might expect to be most readily inferred based on surnames.

The second case worth considering is when a candidate has party support but an uncommon name. In this case too, the evidence suggests that there is no effect on election outcomes. Candidates with extremely uncommon surnames struggle to build name recognition through party support, likely because voters are not processing their names enough to remember them. That these candidates fail to see returns to campaigning is strong evidence that the candidate name itself is important for election outcomes; if party generated campaigning was providing policy information or some other information to voters, there should be a large direct effect of party support even for candidates with uncommon names.

It is only in the third case, when voters have both a name that is easy to remember and support from the party, that we see positive returns to party support. In this case, candidates are effectively generating electoral support in the election. In these cases, we see that voters learn candidate names and support them at the ballot box.

In the appendix, I report additional models showing broadly the same results. First, I use candidate surnames to infer the race of candidates to control for perceived candidate race; race is likely the most important candidate characteristic a voter could determine (or guess) based on a candidate's name. I use the same information available to the candidate to infer the candidate's race and control for it in Table A.1; the findings are substantively and statistically the same. Additionally, because there are relatively few cases and the district fixed effects absorb a significant amount of the variation in the data, in Table A.2 I show that the results do not depend on the district fixed effects. Finally in Table A.3, I use alternate measures of surname commonality looking at relative commonality within a district and again the results are largely the same (although not directly comparable).

## **7 Discussion and Conclusion**

The role of parties in primary elections in the United States is increasingly being studied as an extension of party power. How and when parties involve themselves in primaries can help explain patterns observed across the presidency, Senate, and House and help researchers understand who runs for office and who wins.

In primary elections for the US House of Representatives, parties exert influence at the ground level. While these primaries are often less salient than Presidential, Senate, and Gubernatorial primaries and so direct intervention might be less likely to succeed, local party actors can work around this by providing support to candidates they support that those candidates use to win primaries. Party actors tend to focus this support on candidates who have experience in elected office. I argued that this is because candidates with prior elected experience represent a visible pool of candidates with known ideological positions to choose from. Party actors were further seen to

strongly prefer candidates close to the ideological center of the party; candidates who are neither too extreme nor too moderate. Once candidates receive party support, their chances of winning elections rise dramatically.

To explain this pattern, I looked closely at the differential impact of party support on electoral success. While in general party support does predict electoral success, I show that this is most true for candidates with highly common names. These names are more recognizable to voters and as a result should be easier for voters to remember once they are exposed to them. I show that candidates with the most common names experience the largest returns from party support while candidates with less common names do not receive this benefit.

The fact that parties appear to influence primary election outcomes through name recognition has an important implication for polarization. If voters rely on name recognition, they are not using actual candidate ideologies to make their decisions in primaries. This cedes control of shaping the ideological distribution of the party's elected members to the party who do not share the same preferences as voters. As noted earlier, party actors prefer non-centrist candidates to centrist ones, consistent with Broockman et al. (2021). Thus even though primary electorates may be less extreme than the party, primaries themselves continue to contribute to polarization as their outcomes reflect party goals instead of the goals of voters.

My findings suggests two important areas for future work to address. First, future work needs to continue to explore how elites drive election outcomes. While my work focuses on the party's role in primaries, there are many other elite groups that are increasingly active in politics. Interest groups also have access to campaign expertise, committed volunteer bases, and staff that can provide intangible benefits to campaigns. Candidates looking to mount insurgent campaigns against incumbents, for instance, might use this type of outside support to build a campaign.

Organized social movements like Black Lives Matter or non-traditional party adjacent groups like the Democratic Socialists of America are increasingly providing candidates with support outside of the party system. This gives candidates who might not fit the ideological mould of a party the chance to win primary elections, potentially in safe districts where they can go on to be elected.



Candidates like Alexandria Ocasio Cortez can win elections this way. If this trend continues, parties will likely lose some of their control over primary elections. Recent evidence suggests this is a growing trend. The preference for experienced candidates identified here is shrinking; thanks to early funding from outside of a district, inexperienced political outsiders are increasingly successful in primary elections (Porter and Treul, 2019). Non-party actors increasingly provide the resources parties used to control.

Second, these findings also speak to the need to better understand non-presidential primary campaigns themselves. The actual campaign activity and campaign style in Congressional primaries remains extremely poorly understood. Little is known about how, when, and why candidates choose to invest in different modes of advertising, door knocking, and campaigning activity. This is despite primary campaigns likely being a source of some of the most active persuasion in political communication as voters almost always enter the campaign without having made up their mind. This makes primaries a very useful place to study how and why different types of advertising and campaigning are effective.

## References

- Ahler, Douglas J., Jack Citrin, and Gabriel S. Lenz (2016). “Do Open Primaries Improve Representation? An Experimental Test of California’s 2012 Top-Two Primary”. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 41.2, pp. 237–268.
- Ahler, Douglas, Jack Citrin, and Gabriel S. Lenz (2015). “Why Voters May Have Failed to Reward Proximate Candidates in the 2012 Top Two Primary”. *California Journal of Politics and Policy* 7.1.
- Boatright, Robert G. (2013). *Getting Primaried: The Changing Politics of Congressional Primary Challenges*. University of Michigan Press. 273 pp.
- Bonica, Adam (2014). “Mapping the Ideological Marketplace”. *American Journal of Political Science* 58.2. eprint: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ajps.12062>, pp. 367–386.
- (2018). “Inferring Roll-Call Scores from Campaign Contributions Using Supervised Machine Learning”. *American Journal of Political Science* 62.4, pp. 830–848.
- Bornstein, R. F. and P. R. D’Agostino (1992a). “Stimulus Recognition and the Mere Exposure Effect”. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 63.4, pp. 545–552.
- Bornstein, R F and P R D’Agostino (1992b). “Stimulus recognition and the mere exposure effect”. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 63.4, pp. 545–552.
- Broockman, David E., Nicholas Carnes, Melody Crowder-Meyer, and Christopher Skovron (2021). “Why Local Party Leaders Don’t Support Nominating Centrists”. *British Journal of Political Science* 51.2. Publisher: Cambridge University Press, pp. 724–749.
- Burden, Barry C. (2002). “When Bad Press Is Good News: The Surprising Benefits of Negative Campaign Coverage”. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 7.3. Publisher: SAGE Publications, pp. 76–89.
- Cho, Seok-ju and Insun Kang (2015). “Open primaries and crossover voting”. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 27.3. Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 351–379.
- Dancey, Logan and Geoffrey Sheagley (2018). “Partisanship and Perceptions of Party-Line Voting in Congress”. *Political Research Quarterly* 71.1. Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc, pp. 32–45.
- Downs, Anthony (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper. 310 pp.
- Ge, Qi and Stephen Wu (2022). “How Do You Say Your Name? Difficult-To-Pronounce Names and Labor Market Outcomes”. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
- Hall, Andrew and Chloe Lim (2018). *Ideology and News Content in Contested U.S. House Primaries*. Working Paper.
- Hassell, Hans J. G. (2016). “Party Control of Party Primaries: Party Influence in Nominations for the US Senate”. *The Journal of Politics* 78.1, pp. 75–87.
- (2018). “Principled Moderation: Understanding Parties’ Support of Moderate Candidates: Principled Moderation and Parties”. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 43.2, pp. 343–369.
- Hill, Seth J. (2020). “Sidestepping primary reform: political action in response to institutional change”. *Political Science Research and Methods*. Publisher: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–17.
- Hill, Seth and Chris Tausanovitch (2018). “Southern realignment, party sorting, and the polarization of American primary electorates, 1958–2012”. *Public Choice* 176.1, pp. 107–132.
- Hirano, Shigeo and Jr Snyder (2019). *Primary Elections in the United States*. OCLC: 1117651809. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 358 pp.

- Hirano, Shigeo, James M. Snyder Jr, Stephen Ansolabehere, and John Mark Hansen (2010). “Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress”. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 5.2. Publisher: Now Publishers, Inc., pp. 169–191.
- Hirano, Shigeo, Gabriel S Lenz, Maksim Pinkovskiy, and James M Snyder (2015). “Voter Learning in State Primary Elections”. *American Journal of Political Science* 59.1, pp. 91–108.
- Jacobson, Gary C. (1989). “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946–86”. *The American Political Science Review* 83.3, pp. 773–793.
- (2015). “It’s Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections”. *The Journal of Politics* 77.3. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 861–873.
- Jacobson, Gary C. and Jamie Carson (2019). *The Politics of Congressional Elections, Tenth Edition*. 10th ed. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 376 pp.
- Kam, Cindy D. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister (2013). “Name Recognition and Candidate Support”. *American Journal of Political Science* 57.4, pp. 971–986.
- Kousser, Thad, Scott Lucas, Seth Masket, and Eric McGhee (2015). “Kingmakers or Cheerleaders? Party Power and the Causal Effects of Endorsements”. *Political Research Quarterly* 68.3. Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc, pp. 443–456.
- Kujala, Jordan (2021). *Unconventional Nominations: Party Conventions and Representation in the United States*. Working Paper.
- Lerman, Dawn and Ellen Garbarino (2002). “Recall and Recognition of Brand Names: A Comparison of Word and Nonword Name Types”. *Psychology & Marketing* 19.7-8, pp. 621–639.
- Lockhart, Mackenzie and Seth J. Hill (2022). *How Do General Election Incentives Affect the Visible and Invisible Primary?* Working Paper.
- Lodge, Milton, Kathleen M. McGraw, and Patrick Stroh (1989). “An Impression-Driven Model of Candidate Evaluation”. *American Political Science Review* 83.2. Publisher: Cambridge University Press, pp. 399–419.
- McCarty, Nolan (2019). *Polarization: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Publication Title: Polarization. Oxford University Press.
- Moskowitz, Daniel J. (2021). “Local News, Information, and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections”. *American Political Science Review*. Publisher: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–16.
- Porter, Rachel and Sarah Treul (2019). *Inexperience and Success in Congressional Primaries*. Working Paper.
- Schaffner, Brian F. and Matthew J. Streb (2002). “The Partisan Heuristic in Low-Information Elections\*”. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 66.4, pp. 559–581.
- Theriault, Sean M. (2006). “Party Polarization in the US Congress: Member Replacement and Member Adaptation”. *Party Politics* 12.4. Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 483–503.
- Zaller, John (1992). *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 367 pp.

Table A1: Determinants of electoral success, controlling for imputed race.

	Democrats	Republicans
Support from Party	-0.005 [-0.026, 0.016]	-0.052 [-0.516, 0.411]
Log Name Frequency	-0.008 [-0.033, 0.017]	0.021* [0.002, 0.040]
Total Donations	0.000* [0.000, 0.000]	0.000*** [0.000, 0.000]
Ideology	0.035 [-0.019, 0.089]	0.035* [0.009, 0.061]
Experience	0.267*** [0.169, 0.364]	0.152** [0.062, 0.242]
Black	-0.131 [-0.306, 0.045]	0.010 [-0.176, 0.195]
Hispanic	-0.030 [-0.223, 0.163]	-0.071 [-0.262, 0.120]
Other	-0.122 [-0.359, 0.115]	0.060 [-0.165, 0.285]
White	-0.040 [-0.239, 0.158]	0.092 [-0.099, 0.284]
Name Frequency X Party Support	0.008* [0.002, 0.013]	0.141** [0.041, 0.242]
Num.Obs.	480	628

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

## Appendix

### A Alternate model specifications

#### A.1 Models with imputed race

To control for the possibility that voters might be using candidate names to infer race and that is driving the results, I use the “Who are you?” package (CITE) to infer candidate race based on their names. The package uses census name and race data to infer the probability a person with a given name is of a given race. Based on this, I take the race that is the most likely and assign it to the candidate; this mirrors how a voter might use race to infer the candidate’s race. I include this as an additional control and find that it does not substantively impact the results.

#### A.2 Models without district fixed effects

Because there are relatively few open seat races in each election cycle, the district fixed effects absorb significant variation. To show that the results do not depend on this modelling choice, I run the same model without district effects; the results do not change.

Table A2: Determinants of electoral success ommitting district fixed effects.

	Democrats	Republicans
Support from Party	-0.008 [-0.022, 0.006]	-0.079 [-0.247, 0.088]
Log Name Frequency	-0.011+ [-0.019, -0.003]	-0.001 [-0.016, 0.014]
Total Donations	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]
Ideology	-0.020 [-0.041, 0.002]	-0.003 [-0.009, 0.003]
Experience	0.157+ [0.044, 0.269]	0.126 [0.014, 0.237]
Name Frequency X Party Support	0.006*** [0.005, 0.006]	0.124** [0.094, 0.154]
Num.Obs.	480	628

+  $p < 0.1$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

### A.3 Models with relative surname commonality

To account for the fact that if two candidates have similarly common names, the advantage might be smaller, I consider two alternate measures of commonality. First, I construct a measure of which candidate in a primary has the most common surname of all the candidates in the primary capturing which candidate has the absolute advantage. Second, I look at the relative surname advantage for candidates compared to the candidate with the most common surname in the district. These measures produce results that are in the same direction as the main results presented in the text of the paper. However, there is some noise in this measure and because the units are different to the ones used above, the results are not directly comparable to those presented in the main text.

Table A3: Determinants of electoral success using alternate measures of surname commonality.

	Democrats	Democrats	Republicans	Republicans
Support from Party	0.003 [-0.021, 0.027]	0.005 [-0.016, 0.027]	0.353+ [0.119, 0.586]	0.648** [0.540, 0.755]
Most common name	-0.094 [-0.236, 0.048]		0.039 [-0.220, 0.298]	
Total Donations	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]
Ideology	0.033 [-0.012, 0.078]	0.035 [-0.020, 0.091]	0.029 [-0.008, 0.067]	0.029 [-0.006, 0.064]
Experience	0.254+ [0.046, 0.461]	0.263 [0.041, 0.486]	0.157 [0.012, 0.301]	0.152 [0.018, 0.286]
Name Frequency X Party Support	0.051+ [0.010, 0.092]	0.000 [0.000, 0.000]	0.091 [-0.382, 0.565]	0.001** [0.001, 0.001]
Relative surname advantage		0.000+ [-0.001, 0.000]		0.000 [0.000, 0.000]
Num.Obs.	480	480	628	628

+ p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001

## B 25 most common surnames in the United States

The most common surnames in descending order based on US Census Bureau information. Common names appear to vary in apparent race, ethnicity, immigration status.

1. SMITH
2. JOHNSON
3. WILLIAMS
4. BROWN
5. JONES
6. MILLER
7. DAVIS
8. GARCIA
9. RODRIGUEZ
10. WILSON
11. MARTINEZ

12. ANDERSON
13. TAYLOR
14. THOMAS
15. HERNANDEZ
16. MOOR
17. MARTIN
18. JACKSON
19. THOMPSON
20. WHITE
21. LOPEZ
22. LEE
23. GONZALEZ
24. HARRIS
25. CLARK